1980, pp. 12 – 21; and West, M16, p. 180.
 (40) Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p. 137.
 (41) ibid., p. 142.
 (42) Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 
75
 (43) Basil Davidson, 'Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War', New Statesman, 4 JULY 
1980 , p. 11.
 (44) Private letter to Peter Calvocoressi.
 (45) Stafford , Britain and European Resistance, p. 180.
 (46) Verrier, Looking Glass, p. 24.


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 (1) There are many versions of these events. The best is to be found in Callum 
A. MacDonald, 'The Venio Affair', European Studies Review, vol. 8, no. 4 
(October 1978), pp. 443 – 64.
 (2) David Astor, 'Why the Revolt against Hitler was Ignored', Encounter, June 
1969, p. 7.
 (3) Telegram from D. G. Osborne (The Vatican) to London , 1 December 1939 , in 
'Papst Pius XII, die britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition in Winter 
1939/40', Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 22, no. 3 (1974).
 (4) Astor, 'Revolt against Hitler', p. 8.
 (5) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 445.
 (6) West, M16, p. 71.
 (7) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 448.
 (8) Christie Papers, CHRS 1/27 – 8, Churchill College , Cambridge .
 (9) W. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: Deutsch, 1956), p. 106.
 (10) S. Payne Best, The Venio Incident (London: Hutchinson, 1950), p. 7.
 (11) MacDonald, 'Venio Affair', p. 459.
 (12) PRO, FO/371/C./7324/89/15, Churchill directive, 28 June 1940 .
 (13) C. Simpson and P. Knightley, 'The Secret List of Rudolph Hess', Sunday 
Times, 7 November 1982 .
 (14) Churchill's secretary. Sir John Colville, in interview with Colin Simpson 
and author, November 1982.
 (15) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 100.
 (16) West, M16, p. 112.
 (17) ibid., pp. 186 – 7.
 (18) ibid., p. 110.
 (19) ibid., pp. 152 – 3.
 (20) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 367.
 (21) West, M16, pp. 84, 225.
 (22) ibid., p. 44.
 (23) ibid., pp. 50 – 2, 74.
 (24) Louis de Jong, 'Britain and Dutch Resistance, 1940^ 1945', p. 21. 
Notifies voor het Geschied werk, no. 109 (undated), Netherlands State Institute 
for War Documentation.
 (25) See Hans L. Trefousse, 'The Failure of German Intelligence in the United 
States, 1939 – 1945', Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 42, no. 1 
(June 1955).
 (26) Joint Weekly Intelligence Summary, British Troops, Austria. Liddell Hart 
Collection, 9/24/229, University of London, King's College Centre for Military 
Archives.
 (27) West, M16, pp. 173, 184.
 (28) ibid., pp. 200 – 1.
 (29) Trefousse, 'Failure of German Intelligence', p. 100.
 (30) 'The Profession of Intelligence', part 2, BBC Radio 4, 12 March 1980.
 (31) The correspondence between Liddell and Johnson, and Johnson and the State 
Department is in the National Archives, Washington under: US Embassy, London, 
1940 – 1941, RG 84, Box 4/820/02/C/1940.
 (32) Farago, Foxes, pp. 472 – 3.
 (33) The Times, 6 September 1944.
 (34) Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 30 – 1.
 (35) David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle 
East (London: Kimber, 198G), p. 190.
 (36) Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 1, p. 58.
 (37) Mure, Master of Deception, p. 165.
 (38) ibid., p. 37.
 (39) Letter from Philby to author, 27 March 1978.
 (40) Dusko Popov, Spy/Counter Spy (London: Panther, 1976), p. 223.
 (41) 'German Naval Intelligence, Part B: Naval Intelligence and the Normandy 
Invasion', 15 October 1946, p. 44, US National Archives, Washington DC.
 (42) See Gert Buchheit, Spionage in zwei Weltkriegen (Landshut: Politisches 
Archiv, 1975), p. 326; and O. Reile, 'Wer tauschte die deutsche militarische 
Fuhrung liber die Starke der in England fur die Invasion bereitgestellten 
Streitkrafte?' Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, no. 3 (1979), p. 83.
 (43) Buchheit, Spionage, p. 326.
 (44) 'German Naval Intelligence', cit. at n. 41, p. 68.
 (45) Reile, 'Wer tauschte', p. 83.
 (46) Mure, Master of Deception, p. 176.